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APPLYING THE LAWS OF LOGIC TO THE LOGIC 
OF LAW 
Hillel Bavli* 
INTRODUCTION 
Consistency is a necessary condition of a just legal system, without 
which arbitrariness, unequal treatment, unpredictability, and, ultimately, 
injustice must result.  “The truth,” remarked Justice Holmes, “is that the 
law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency.”1  But beyond 
meager intuition, or bare observation, is it possible to rigorously examine 
internal logical consistency2—mutual compatibility among legal 
deductions—in the rule of law?3
Kurt Gödel, in a 1931 publication of a German scientific periodical, 
disproved the then-common assumption that each area of mathematics can 
be sufficiently axiomatized as to enable the development of an “endless 
totality of true propositions” about a given area of inquiry.
 
4  Specifically, 
he proved that any formal logical system (a concept that I shall more 
clearly explain below) that entails sufficient means as to support 
elementary arithmetic5 is necessarily subject to the inherent characteristic 
of incompleteness: arithmetical propositions which can be neither proved 
nor disproved within the system.6
 
* J.D. candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law.  Special thanks to my family 
and friends, and particularly to my parents and grandparents, for their support, and to 
Professors John Pfaff, Christian Turner, and Dominic Balestra for their helpful comments. 
  Impliedly, every such system 
 1. Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of 
Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 
1439, 1450 (1992) (quoting O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881)). 
 2. Compare external consistency, which relates deductions to truth external to the 
relevant system.  See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL 
GOLDEN BRAID 94-95 (1999). 
 3. See ERNEST NAGEL & JAMES R. NEWMAN, GÖDEL’S PROOF 13 (Douglas R. 
Hofstadter ed., rev. ed. 2002); HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 94-100. 
 4. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 4. 
 5. Arithmetic concerns the relations between whole numbers.  KURT GÖDEL, ON 
FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA AND RELATED 
SYSTEMS 1 (Dover ed. 1992). 
 6. Id. at 1, 57. 
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necessarily inheres either incompleteness or inconsistency.  Further, Gödel 
proved the impossibility of establishing “internal logical consistency of a 
very large class of deductive systems . . . unless one adopts principles of 
reasoning so complex that their internal consistency is as open to doubt as 
that of the systems themselves.”7
If applicable to law (a significant contingency indeed), Gödel’s proof 
indicates unavoidable judicial susceptibility to inconsistency, since 
abstinence from adjudication of formally undecidable cases is impractical.  
Thus, application of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem to the legal context 
would establish a priori limitations on the capacity for consistency to exist 
within the law, as well as on the faculty to establish internal logical 
consistency within the law. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, the law itself manifests plausible limitations 
on its capacity to realize formal consistency, or to be examined with respect 
to its consistency.  Specifically, formalizing a logical axiomatic legal 
system—a requirement of rigorously examining internal logical 
consistency—that retains the fundamental values of justice may prove 
difficult if not impossible.  Further, proving or disproving formal legal 
consistency may require construction of a legal language sufficiently exact 
to map, or mirror, meta-legal statements—statements about a formalized 
legal system—within the legal language itself.  Such construction may 
prove impossible as well. 
I begin by discussing the difficulties of proving consistency within a 
formal system generally.  After establishing the importance of a formalized 
legal model as a prerequisite of rigorous examination of consistency, I 
investigate issues intrinsic to the current system of law that may prevent 
formalization of a just legal system as currently conceived.8
 
 7. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 
  I argue that 
flexibility inherent in a just legal system (in the sense that judges have the 
ability to modify, in response to a given case, the presumptions from which 
that case’s outcome will be derived) may foreclose the possibility of legal 
formalization or any comprehensive model thereof.  I conclude, however, 
that a model whose purpose is the examination of consistency within a 
system need not necessarily retain the dynamic nature of real-world 
formalization.  Rather, a static model of legal formalization may avoid the 
complications confronting a comprehensive formalization of law, while 
retaining the fundamental values critical to examination of consistency 
within the law. 
3, at 5. 
 8. I abstain from expounding upon the common topic of “human intuition” in the law 
and its implications with regard to formalization. 
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I. PROVING CONSISTENCY: A SNAKE EATING ITS OWN TAIL 
Suppose the creation of a system in which certain natural laws are 
presumed true.  Further, specified rules are initially established to allow 
additional laws to be derived from the presumed natural laws, and to allow 
further additional laws to be derived from other derived laws, and so on.  
Let us appropriately call any law that is not a natural law a derived law. 
Suppose that each year many new laws are derived from previously 
derived laws or from natural laws directly.  Can it be shown that after many 
years beyond the system’s creation, and many millions of laws beyond the 
initial natural laws, a contradiction among the system’s laws will not arise?  
It is certainly invalid to conclude that a contradiction will not or cannot 
arise from the fact that one has not already arisen.9
It can be shown that internal consistency among the foundational natural 
laws necessarily implies consistency among further properly derived 
laws.
 
10
A. The Axiomatic Method 
  Thus, to prove impossibility of contradiction among millions of 
eventual derived laws, one must prove consistency among the relatively 
few natural laws (assuming proper derivation).  The possibility of such a 
proof—namely, that of consistency among the assumed foundational 
postulates of a given system—represents the concern of the current section. 
Pure mathematics can be described as a science of deduction.  It is the 
“subject in which we do not know what we are talking about, or whether 
what we are saying is true.”11  Its concern is not the truth of the assumed 
postulates or the deduced conclusions, but only that its deductions follow 
as necessary logical consequences of its assumptions.12  The “axiomatic 
method,” discovered by the ancient Greeks, is a system of deriving 
propositions, or theorems, from accepted postulates known as axioms.13  In 
the aforementioned example, natural laws are the system’s axioms, and 
derived laws are the system’s theorems.14  The ancient Greeks utilized the 
axiomatic method to develop an incredibly complex system of geometry 
deduced from five simple axioms (e.g., a straight line segment can be 
drawn joining any two points).15
 
 9. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 
 
3, at 18-19. 
 10. Id. at 13. 
 11. Id. at 12 (citing “Russel’s famous epigram”). 
 12. Id. at 11. 
 13. See id. at 2. 
 14. See supra Part I (introductory paragraph). 
 15. HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 90.  Euclid’s five axioms state: 
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The Euclidean axioms were presumed to be true statements about space.  
Thus, insofar as theorems were deduced from such axioms, the possibility 
of deducing a contradiction escaped consideration.16
The Nineteenth Century discovery of different, yet equally valid, 
systems of geometry, such as elliptical geometry, destroyed the crutch upon 
which faith in the consistency of Euclidian geometry rested: external 
truth.
  That is, until the 
discovery of a new, non-Euclidian geometry. 
17  How can differing conceptions of a point or line both be true when 
only a single reality exists?18  The notion of mathematics as a real-world, 
rather than an abstract discipline was hereby challenged.19
B. Solving One Problem by Creating Another 
  Establishing the 
internal consistency of such systems suddenly took on critical importance. 
The task of rigorously establishing the internal consistency of a 
system—even a simple system—quickly encounters a significant difficulty; 
specifically, a problematic set of alternative approaches.  One approach is 
to utilize the system’s own rules and postulates to establish its consistency.  
It is difficult, however, to justify reliance on a given system of reasoning to 
prove consistency in that same system of reasoning.  Such analysis is 
circular and therefore unfounded.  “It is like lifting yourself up by your 
own bootstraps.”20
The alternative to grounding a system’s own reasoning in itself is to 
establish grounding in a second system’s reasoning.  This approach, 
however, accomplishes little more than shifting the problem to another 
domain.
 
21
 
(1) A straight line segment can be drawn joining any two points. 
  The proof of one system’s consistency becomes reliant upon the 
consistency of an additional system.  A rigorous proof of the former 
system’s consistency would thus require proof of the latter system’s 
(2) Any straight line segment can be extended indefinitely in a straight line. 
(3) Given any straight line segment, a circle can be drawn having the segment as radius and 
one end point as center. 
(4) All right angles are congruent. 
(5) If two lines are drawn which intersect a third in such a way that the sum of the inner 
angles on one side is less than two right angles, then the two lines inevitably must intersect 
each other on that side if extended far enough.  Id. 
 16. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 13. 
 17. By “external truth,” I refer to truth external to the Euclidean geometric system. 
 18. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 19-21.  Today, the possibility of multiple truths is 
apparent; then, however, it was not.  Id. at 20. 
 19. See id. at 19. 
 20. Id. at 24. 
 21. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 17. 
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consistency, which, in turn, must face the same difficulties plaguing the 
former system’s proof.22
Thus, a dilemma unfolds: proving consistency of a given logical system 
seemingly requires the illogical reasoning of internal circularity, or of 
“solving” one problem by creating an equivalent one. 
 
C. Metamathematics 
The solution to the consistency dilemma resides in a critical distinction 
between mathematics and metamathematics.  The issue at hand, the 
provability of the internal consistency of a formal system (which, for now, 
I shall assume to be a mathematical system), is not one that belongs to that 
system in the sense that it speaks the language and to the domain of that 
system.  Rather, it speaks about the system.  Statements about a 
mathematical system belong to what German mathematician David Hilbert 
prescribed the term “metamathematics,” a language about mathematics.23
For example, the expressions “2 + 5 = 7,” “X + 6 = 14,” and “0 = 0” 
belong to the language of mathematics, while the expressions “7 is a prime 
number,” “every number has a successor number,” and “formal system X is 
consistent” belong to the language of metamathematics.
 
24
Mathematicians Russel and Whitehead produced Principia 
Mathematica, which set forth to create a universal and unambiguous 
language of mathematical reasoning.
 
25  Principia Mathematica purported 
to deduce all of mathematics from logic without contradiction.26  It derived 
the axioms of number theory from formal logic, thus reducing the issue of 
the system’s consistency to the question of consistency among the system 
of formal logic itself.27  It was uncertain, however, whether the system 
contained all of mathematics, or whether the system of reasoning was even 
internally consistent.  Thus, the issue of proving consistency once again 
prevails: could it be shown that no contradiction would ever be derived 
from the methods delineated in Principia Mathematica?28
Hilbert’s program endeavored to skirt the aforementioned difficulties 
resulting from relative proofs of consistency by constructing “absolute” 
proofs, whereby proof of a system’s consistency would not require the 
  Hilbert 
challenged the world of mathematics to do just that! 
 
 22. See id. at 7-24. 
 23. See id. at 27-28; GÖDEL, supra note 5, at 1-2. 
 24. See NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 25-36. 
 25. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 23. 
 26. See id. 
 27. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 43. 
 28. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 23. 
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assumption of consistency in a second system.  Hilbert sought a proof of 
consistency or completeness that relied only upon “finitistic” models of 
reasoning (a concept beyond the scope of the current paper).29  His 
program was soon to be shattered by Gödel’s proof.30
II. GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM 
 
Kurt Gödel revolutionized the study of systems and the field of 
mathematics in his 1931 publication of the paper On Formally Undecidable 
Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems.31  Gödel 
addressed the difficulties of proving consistency in formal systems by 
ingeniously employing a mathematical tool known as “mapping.”  He 
thereby laid to rest the ancient question of completeness and consistency in 
formal mathematics.  His conclusions, however, were not those sought or 
expected by the mathematics community.32
A. Mapping 
  Gödel’s proof shattered the 
possibility of complete and consistent axiomatization.  In so doing, he sent 
shockwaves through the worlds of mathematics, the sciences, and 
philosophy. 
Mapping is a fundamental mathematical technique used to mirror 
concepts from one domain upon another while retaining their abstract 
structure and relation.  For example, geometric terms are mirrored in 
algebra, spherical shapes are projected on geometric planes, and electric 
currents are mapped in hydrodynamics.33  Gödel utilized this feature of 
mapping to translate complicated metamathematical statements about a 
formalized system of arithmetic into arithmetical statements within the 
system itself.34  Gödel’s implementation of mapping enabled him to 
transcend the difficulties and limitations of proving consistency in the 
language of metamathematics (specifically, to transcend the complexities 
of proof through finitistic metamathematical models).35
B. Incompleteness or Inconsistency 
 
Proposition VI of Gödel’s proof asserts that any formal system 
 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id.  This paper was later published under the same title.  See supra note 5. 
 32. See supra notes 25-29. 
 33. See NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 64. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. at 66. 
BAVLI_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:17 PM 
2006] LOGIC OF LAW 107 
sufficiently complex to support arithmetic36 must contain statements that 
are either internally “undecidable”—statements that cannot be proved or 
disproved within the system—or provably inconsistent.37
Gödel constructed a formula, G, within arithmetic, representing the 
statement, “The formula G is not provable within the system.”
  Proposition VI 
proves that every such formal system must be incomplete or inconsistent. 
38  He 
demonstrated that G is provable if, and only if, its negation, ~G, is 
provable.39  (Try it!  Ask yourself whether G has a proof within the 
system.)  If both a formula and its negation are provable within a system, 
then the system is, by definition, inconsistent.  Alternatively, if the system 
is consistent, then both G and ~G are not provable within the system.40  
Gödel’s proof resulted in the recognition that performance of higher 
mathematics requires some degree of “informal metamathematical 
reasoning.”41
III. LIMITATIONS ON FORMAL EXAMINATION OF CONSISTENCY 
WITHIN THE LAW 
 
The key ingredient to rigorous examination of the logical consistency of 
a system is the formalization of that system.42
A. Formalization 
  Up to this point, I have 
referred to “formal systems” and “formalization” with relative informality.  
I now explain exactly what is meant by such terms. 
A formal system is a process of reasoning by which “truths” are deduced 
from the system’s assumptions, or axioms.  A formal system consists of 
three ingredients: 1) a definite (objective) language of symbols and syntax; 
2) a set of axioms defined as, “a finite list of general propositions whose 
truth, given the meanings of the symbols, is supposed to be self-evident”; 
and 3) a set of rules by which new propositions may be inferred from 
axioms and established propositions.43
 
 36. Practically speaking, a system need not be very complex to support arithmetic. 
 
 37. GÖDEL, supra note 5, at 62. 
 38. See id. at 63. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 57-62.  See also NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 92-93; HOFSTADTER, 
supra note 2, at 17-19. 
 41. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1468. 
 42. See GÖDEL, supra note 5, at 4; NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 10-14. 
 43. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1445 (quoting ROGER PENROSE, THE 
EMPEROR’S NEW MIND: CONCERNING COMPUTERS, MINDS, AND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS 102-
05 (1989)). 
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“The system’s rules must be defined solely in the system’s language,” 
and must be solely in relation to “other rules within the system.”44  The 
fundamental component of a formal system is that its derivations depend 
solely upon the system’s rules of inference and its initial axioms.45
Note that a formal system does not require that any question be 
determinately deducible, only that every deduction be complete, consistent, 
and resultant solely from the axioms and rules of inference.  A designedly 
formal system that is unable to answer certain problems while maintaining 
consistency is said to be “indeterminate” (Gödel’s theorem thus places 
limits on the determinacy of formal systems).
  
Deductions within a formal system are definite and conclusive. 
46
I use the term “formalization” to refer to the process of transforming an 
informal system into a formal one while retaining the system’s basic 
properties.  Thus, formalization of an informal system of law refers to 
creating an objective legal language, a set of axioms, and definite rules of 
inference, such that all results are conclusive deductions solely from the 
system’s axioms and rules of inference, while retaining the system’s basic 
properties. 
 
Consider the importance of formalization with regard to examination of 
a system’s internal consistency.47  The reliance on “truth” external to a 
system was a flaw that crushed ancient systems of reasoning.48  As 
mentioned above, pure mathematics—the science of deduction—has no 
concern for “truth,” but only that its deductions are necessary and logical 
consequences of its axioms.49
Entertain the question of consistency in a system that lacks an objective 
language, a definite set of axioms, and rules of inference—a system that 
lacks formalization.  The concept of consistency within such a system is 
difficult to imagine, if not utterly inexistent.  Consider proving or 
disproving consistency between one “derivation” and another in a system 
lacking definite axioms from which “derivations” are to be deduced, or 
rules by which “derivations” are to be inferred, or a language in which 
“derivations” are to be expressed with objectivity.  The three components 
of the formal system are critical to the examination of consistency in the 
current understanding of the concept. 
 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 1444-48. 
 47. It may be helpful to review the section on the axiomatic method, supra notes 9-19 
and accompanying text. 
 48. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
 49. See supra notes 11-19. 
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IV. MODELING LAW AS A FORMALIZED SYSTEM 
The law in its current state is not formalized.  It is true, however, that 
only rarely do transactions become controversies, and seldom do 
controversies become court cases, indicating that the legal system does, in 
fact, enable parties to apply legal deductions accurately in the vast majority 
of cases.  (Consider the multitude of transactions occurring each day of 
your life.  How many of them result in court cases?).  Additionally, most 
court cases are easily determinable and even those that are not usually 
result in agreement among judges and scholars.50  Only rarely do divided 
opinions and interpretations result, and such divergence may result from 
discrepancies in levels of intelligence or judicial error.51
The law, however, does allow for a great diversity of opinion and 
interpretation.  Legal language is vague; statutes and rulings are wide open 
to interpretation; various conceptions of law—all valid—create 
discrepancies in judicial focus and notions of justice; and “justice” itself 
often promotes indeterminacy.  However, of relevance is not whether law is 
or is not formal, but whether law can or cannot be modeled as a formal 
system for purposes of examination of consistency within the law.
 
52
A. Legal Language 
 
Legal English is the language of law in the United States.  At issue is 
whether legal English (or any language of equivalent complexity) is 
sufficiently exact as to satisfy the first requirement of a formal system—a 
definite and objective language of symbols and syntax.  Arguably, 
language is, by its very nature, subjective, thus affording the judiciary free 
reign to interpret the law (such as statutes and precedent) and decide cases 
in accordance with its own standards and intentions.53
 
 50. Supreme Court cases, however, are particularly selected for their difficulty, thus 
resulting in divergent opinions and interpretations.  See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 
S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 409 (1985); see also Brown & Greenberg, supra note 
  Such utter 
subjectivity, however, likely overstates the case.  More plausible is the 
view that aspects of language are vague, but that generally language is 
quite clear.  Further, it is doubtful that language can appropriately be 
dichotomized between clear and unclear concepts.  Rather, varying degrees 
of clarity likely exist within a continuum.  Thus, the issue turns upon the 
1, at 1452. 
 51. Brown & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1452-54. 
 52. Note that a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of formalization is very 
interesting but exceeds the scope of the current paper, which is concerned with 
formalization insofar as it allows examination of consistency within the legal system. 
 53. See Stanley Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 495, 503 
(1982); Stanley Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEX. L. REV. 299, 314 (1983). 
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degree of precision necessary to establish objectivity.  Since formal 
systems remain primarily a concept belonging to mathematics, let us 
assume sufficient (but not necessarily required) objectivity in languages of 
equal or greater clarity than that of mathematics.54
It is quite clear that legal language has yet to achieve a level of definition 
even close to that achieved by mathematics.  Recall, however, that the 
question at hand is not whether legal language does satisfy the demands of 
formalism, but rather whether it can satisfy such demands.  It may be that 
relative objectivity may only exist at the sacrifice of another property that 
is fundamental to a just legal system.  Perhaps subjectivity is a virtue in 
itself!  Whatever the case may be, until valid proof is offered one way or 
the other, which is not the case currently, the possibility of objectivity in 
the language of law cannot be ignored.  Further, while the complexities of 
legal language may limit the practicability of producing an objective 
language, its accomplishment in mathematics evinces otherwise (although, 
arguably, mathematics does not entail at least equivalent complexity).  
Suffice it to say that impracticability must not be assumed. 
 
B. Implanting the Heart and Circulation of a Formal System: Its 
Axioms and Rules of Inference 
The heart of a formal system is its set of axioms and rules of inference.  
This section examines the potential for establishing rules of legal reasoning 
and axiomatizing the law while retaining its fundamental values. 
It is easy to imagine a determinate formal system of law that fails to 
retain its fundamental values.  For example, a legal system consisting of the 
rule, “All plaintiffs lose,” provides a complete, consistent, and conclusive 
ruling for each case.55
Rather than discuss the heavily-debated role of “intuition” in the law, 
and its implications with regard to the possibility of legal formalization, my 
goal in the following sections is to expound upon issues intrinsic to a just 
legal system which may preclude the possibility of modeling a formalized 
system of law.  Specifically, I discuss problems inherent in formulating a 
single and definite set of axioms, as well as in axiomatizing law generally. 
  However, the system fails to retain the current 
system’s notion of justice (or anything closely related to it) and is therefore 
uninteresting for purposes of examining consistency in the law.  Thus, it is 
of fundamental importance to design a formal model only while preserving 
the object system’s values. 
 
 54. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1458-59. 
 55. See Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 
YALE L.J. 1, 5-6 (1984); see also Brown & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1463. 
BAVLI_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:17 PM 
2006] LOGIC OF LAW 111 
A discussion of the various functions of the legal system is well beyond 
the scope of the current paper.  Thus, I assume that justice is the primary 
goal of the legal system.  My analysis, however, requires only that justice 
be a fundamental value in the system. 
1. Modeling a Single Set of Axioms from a Multitude of Such Sets 
Imagine a formalized legal system whereby all statutes and common-law 
precedent form the system’s axioms (assume that statutes and precedent 
embody societal values like fairness and efficiency).  New rules in the form 
of judicial rulings are produced only by applying the system’s axioms to a 
set of facts (presumed to be known) and deducing logical inferences from 
established axioms to produce rules explicitly directed to such facts. 
The model’s oversimplification reveals many problems that would 
similarly apply to more complex models.  One such problem is the 
requirement that a formal system feature a finite list of propositions, the 
truth of which is presumed—a definite set of axioms.  In the simplified 
example provided, a definite set of axioms composed of statutes and 
precedent becomes a multitude of sets when considered with respect to 
each judge (and other administrators of the law), since no two judges 
maintain identical interpretations of the law.  Each judge’s interpretation 
translates to its own set of axioms—and that assumes that each judge has a 
clear idea of his interpretation in the first place. 
A model may arguably circumvent the problem of multitudinous sets of 
axioms by assuming the potential of amalgamating contradictory sets to 
produce a single set of axioms.  Similarly, a model may approach the law 
from the perspective of a single judge. 
Thus, the issue turns upon the propriety of such models.  At least two 
objections can be made to them: first, that models assuming amalgamation 
of many subjective interpretations, or law as conceived by a single judge, 
ignore real-world conditions, and are therefore trivial in value; second, that 
such models fail to align with common conceptions of justice within the 
legal system. 
Formulation of a single set of axioms that encompasses the multitude of 
meanings—even contradictory meanings—attached to the law is doubtful, 
if not, by definition, utterly impossible.  Perhaps more feasible is the 
establishment of a set of axioms that indirectly embodies innumerable 
interpretations of the law by achieving consensus on each axiom.  The law 
is, of course, multifaceted such that a simple average could never apply.  
However, just as statutes are established in the first place through 
negotiation, compromise, and ultimately consensus, a second order 
consensus as to the interpretation of statutes and precedent may be 
BAVLI_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:17 PM 
112 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
achievable.  Of course, interpretations may differ on interpretations, thus 
requiring a third order consensus, and so on and so forth, until, eventually, 
the importance of consensus on higher order interpretations is phased out.  
However, for the sake of simplicity, I will ignore this complication. 
Assuming the possibility of modeling a single set of axioms embodying 
the law’s multitudinous interpretations, doing so may chip away properties 
fundamental to a just legal system, and, thus, render the model barren.  
Specifically, the concept of competing axioms may be critical to common 
notions of justice in the law.  Of course, if the virtue of competing axioms 
is moderation via compromise, the same may be achieved through the 
aforementioned second-order consensus. 
If, on the other hand, the value is intrinsic to multiple sets of competing 
axioms, the property is irreplaceable.  Such value, however, is not easily 
found.  In fact, plausibility lies in the contrary: competing axioms are likely 
detrimental insofar as they generate arbitrariness and unequal treatment in 
the law.  A case may have one result before one judge and a contrary result 
before a second judge.  But perhaps a degree of comfort is found in small 
doses of arbitrariness, better known as luck.  The question of intrinsic value 
attached to competing axioms is likely an empirical one. 
Further, the question at hand concerns consistency in the legal system 
generally, not consistency in the administration of law by any single judge.  
The relevance of a single-judge model is therefore questionable, since the 
model would embody the values of an individual judge, rather than those of 
the judiciary as a whole.  However, a single-judge model may, 
nevertheless, provide a stepping stone to creating a more realistic model; 
namely, one that characterizes correspondence among contradictory sets of 
axioms respectively applied by a multitude of judges. 
2. Flexibility: A Concept Diametrically Opposed to Axiomatization 
A formal system features a definite set of axioms solely from which 
conclusions within the system (e.g., theorems or rules) are deduced.  A 
formal legal model would, therefore, require that rulings be derived 
exclusively from its established axioms.  Herein lies a second, perhaps 
more serious, issue with modeling law as a formal system.  Specifically, it 
may be impossible to maintain such requirements while retaining an 
element that is perhaps fundamental to justice: flexibility. 
“Flexibility,” as I use the term, refers to a system’s capacity to modify a 
set of axioms—to use the jargon of formalism—in light of the facts of the 
object case, or, the case to which such axioms are to apply.  In other words, 
critical to the current conception of a just legal system is the system’s 
ability to “overturn,” or “reverse,” previously created precedent (axioms), 
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or even simply to produce new law (to add new axioms), rather than 
applying precedent (drawing deductions solely from the current set of 
axioms).  The issue of such flexibility may pose a fatal blow to the 
possibility of establishing a formal system of law, or, likewise, modeling 
such a system. 
Flexibility, as I use the term, is a concept diametrically opposed to that 
of axiomatization.  In fact, it may be oxymoronic even to define 
“flexibility” as an ability to modify the set of axioms in light of the facts of 
the object case, since where such flexibility exists, a set of definite axioms 
cannot.  Flexibility is undoubtedly a critical component of justice.  Thus, 
the issue with regard to formalization is seemingly incurable. 
It is essential to distinguish the current usage of “flexibility” from the 
term in its more common usage—namely, the law’s ability to account for 
“human” factors such as fairness or clemency.  I assume that such “human” 
elements can, in fact, be incorporated within the system.  For example, a 
given axiom may grant leniency, notwithstanding the system’s more 
substantive-based axioms, under certain predetermined circumstances, such 
as leniency for a mother whose sole motivation for stealing food from a 
supermarket was to provide food for her children.  Thus, “flexibility” in the 
sense of allowing for certain variables other than strict application of 
substantive law—whether in the form of statutes or precedent, or of axioms 
other than those created by statutes or precedent—is not an issue effecting 
problems of formalization.  Such flexibility may indeed be consistent with 
supplying a definite set of axioms. 
The problem at hand is different.  A judge’s ability to modify precedent, 
for example, is critical to the current system’s notion of justice.  However, 
the ability to modify the axioms of a system in response to the object (case) 
to be determined conclusively by such axioms (and rules of inference) 
defeats the very nature of a formal system.  A property intrinsic to justice is 
in direct contravention with the fundamentals of a formal system, thus 
inhering ineluctable incompatibility with formalization or any 
comprehensive model thereof.  That is to say, a model of law as a formal 
system cannot be established insofar as it mirrors the dynamic nature of 
formalization just described.  A model whose purpose is the examination of 
consistency within a system, however, need not necessarily retain the 
dynamic nature of real-world formalization. 
V. A STATIC MODEL OF LAW AS A FORMAL SYSTEM 
The problem described above is unavoidable with regard to 
formalization of the law.  However, a static model of the law as a 
formalized system may manage to circumvent the flexibility problem 
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confronted by formalization itself. 
Flexibility to modify the system’s axioms in response to the case to be 
determined by such axioms renders each and every case, by definition, 
indeterminate.  It further erodes the fundamental nature of a formal system: 
it liquefies the definitiveness of the system’s axioms. 
A model whose purpose is the examination of consistency may, 
however, circumvent the flexibility problem by maintaining a static 
character.  While a dynamic model may, for example, relate currently 
established axioms to future cases (even cases in the immediate future), a 
static model details a system’s axioms only insofar as they exist at any 
given time.  In other words, a model that is dynamic in nature entertains 
future deduction, while a model that is static in nature recognizes a 
system’s axioms and deductions only as the axioms currently exist.  Thus, a 
static model may be of insignificant worth with respect to determination of 
case-outcomes (since flexibility allows modification of axioms).  It may, 
however, be invaluable in examining a system’s consistency, since such 
examination may require formalization.  Unlike inquiry requiring a 
dynamic model, examination of the law’s consistency at any given time 
may, in certain circumstances, require only a model with respect to the 
system’s conditions, such as axioms, rules of inference, and possible 
deductions, as they exist at any such time: a static model. 
CONCLUSION 
The importance of examining consistency within the legal system cannot 
be overstated.  Consistency is the ground upon which fundamental values 
of fairness are rooted.  Rigorous examination of consistency requires 
contemplation of the law modeled as a formal system.  Comprehensive 
modeling of legal formalization may be impracticable, just as formalization 
of law itself may be.  However, simplified models of formalized systems of 
law may provide the fundamental elements necessary to examine 
consistency within the law while retaining the fundamental values of the 
system. 
I have shown that formalization of law ineluctably requires the sacrifice 
of values critical to a just legal system, and that models of such 
formalization may, therefore, entirely spurious. However, a static model of 
formalization may circumvent certain problems extant in dynamic models 
while retaining the values that may allow examination of consistency 
within the law. 
 
